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Analytical documents are a hallmark of the law school legal writing
curriculum and of the practice of law. In these documents, the author
applies a body of law to a set of facts and reaches a conclusion.
Oftentimes, that conclusion is phrased as a prediction (“The court is likely
to find . . .”),1 and many academics even refer to analytical documents as
“predictive” document types.2 If that describes you, my goal is to convince
you to change your ways. Instead of conceptualizing legal analysis as
“predictive,” we should simply conceptualize it as analytical. Rather than
writing predictive conclusions to legal analyses, attorneys and law
students should simply write legal conclusions to legal analyses. Why is
this distinction important? Because when it comes to legal analyses,
couching the conclusion in terms of a prediction is inaccurate. The
conclusion of a legal analysis should be a statement about the law, not a
prediction about the decisionmaker.
Sensing that inaccuracy, phrasing conclusions to legal analyses in the
predictive causes discomfort to some legal writers and can be a barrier
especially when training new legal writers. There is a difference between
conducting a legal analysis and predicting the outcome of a legal dispute.
That line should both be recognized in the teaching of analytical
document genres and be conveyed by legal professionals in the execution
* The author is a Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law and a Non-Resident
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Palau. Thank you to Alexa Chew, Luke Everett, Joe Fore, and Craig
Smith for their input through helpful discussions on this topic. Thank you as well to the editors of this journal, especially
Sarah Adams-Schoen and Amy J. Griffin.
1 See MARY BETH BEAZLEY & MONTE SMITH, LEGAL WRITING FOR LEGAL READERS 173 (2014) (“In the iconic research
memorandum, the senior lawyer will ask the junior lawyer to write an analysis of one or more legal issues, to explore them
objectively, and to predict how a court in the relevant jurisdiction would resolve them.”); Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as
Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 PENN. ST. L. REV. 41, 57 (2018)
(“Research memoranda (a.k.a. ‘legal memoranda’ or ‘formal office memoranda’) have traditionally been the vehicles through
which lawyers record and convey their outcome predictions.”).
2 See infra note 6.
of legal analyses. Thus, law professors and legal supervisors should avoid
instructing their charges to hypothesize on the future actions of a third-
party decisionmaker when what they really want is for the student or
junior attorney to apply the currently existing law to the client’s facts and
arrive at a legal decision.
I. Predictive Conclusions to Legal Analyses are
Inaccurate
Prediction is forecasting a future occurrence. In the legal context, a
prediction often forecasts what a decisionmaker will do.3 For example, a
predictive conclusion is one that surmises that a court is likely (or unlikely)
to find that a set of facts satisfies a legal test. Here are just a couple
examples of predictively oriented conclusions from popular legal writing
texts:
• “[T]he court will probably decide that the substituted service of
process was not valid and vacate the judgment terminating Ms.
Olsen’s parental rights.”4
• “In conclusion, a court in this circuit will likely categorize the
Byerman trial as one raising issues about judicial integrity and
government corruption. Combined with the fact that the Byerman
trial received extensive public attention during and after its time in
court, the court will most likely rule that it was a public
controversy.”5
3 See RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & KRISTEN KONRAD TISCIONE, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 7 (7th ed. 2013).
4 LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK: ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, AND WRITING 119
(6th ed. 2014).
5 ELIZABETH FAJANS, MARY R. FALK & HELENE S. SHAPO, WRITING FOR LAW PRACTICE 278 (2004). I don’t mean to pick on
these sources—plenty of similar examples may be found in other legal writing texts. See, e.g., BEAZLEY & SMITH, supra note
1, at 10 (“A court would almost certainly find Ms. Wheelwright guilty of [the offense] . . . . [A] guilty verdict is almost
certain.”); CHRISTINE COUGHLIN, JOAN MALMUD ROCKLIN & SANDY PATRICK, A LAWYER WRITES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO LEGAL ANALYSIS 9 (2d ed. 2013) (“Accordingly, a court will likely determine that Mr. Adams was not stopped and that his
statement about the lollipop is admissible.”); JOHN C. DERNBACH, RICHARD V. SINGLETON II, CATHLEEN S. WHARTON,
JOAN M. RUHTENBERG & CATHERINE J. WASSON, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 452 (5th ed.
2013) (“Thus, the court will likely find that the statute was tolled until he was denied admission and therefore conclude that
Tyler’s claim is not time-barred.”); LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 384 (5th
ed. 2010) (“On the facts as we presently understand them, a court would probably rule that Buckley did not misrepresent her
age.”); MARY BARNARD RAY, THE BASICS OF LEGAL WRITING 125 (2006) (“In light of these facts, a court is likely to conclude
that Abbott should have known his conduct was so egregious that it created a substantial risk of significant harm to others.”).
6 See, e.g., OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 4, at 193 (“In a one-issue memorandum, the conclusion is used to predict how the
issue will be decided and to summarize the reasons supporting that prediction.”); BEAZLEY & SMITH, supra note 1, at 11
(“Some legal writing is predictive: it predicts how a court will apply a particular law to a particular set of facts. Examples of
this kind of writing include office memos, opinion letters, and law review articles.”); TERESA J. REID RAMBO & LEANNE J.
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Numerous legal writing texts instruct writers to conceptualize legal
conclusions as predictions,6 and some even go so far as to offer examples
of predictively-oriented subsection headings in analytical memoranda.7
This characterization—that a conclusion to a legal analysis is a
prediction—is misleading and inaccurate.
Here’s the problem: to make a prediction about the outcome of a
particular decision, the predictor should take account of any and all
factors that may influence the decisionmaker. Certainly, legal analysis—
how a body of law applies to a set of facts—weighs heavily on how a court
will decide a particular legal issue. However, numerous extralegal factors
may also influence the decision. If the author of an analysis hasn’t
accounted for extralegal factors that may influence the decisionmaker,
they have no business predicting what “the court” is likely to do.
Take a hypothetical office memo assignment. The client is a
restaurant in Iowa, and the restaurant is considering suing a competitor
for misappropriating its smoothie recipes. A junior attorney is assigned to
write an analytical memo assessing whether the restaurant’s smoothie
recipes are protected trade secrets under Iowa state law. Let’s say the
junior attorney researches the law and finds that Iowa has a statute that
protects trade secrets, and the statute helpfully defines trade secrets. The
junior attorney researches cases from Iowa and elsewhere and finds no
case law involving a claim that smoothie recipes are trade secrets.
However, she finds case law that protects other types of recipes as trade
secrets, and she determines that those other cases are fairly analogous to
the client’s situation with the smoothie recipes. Thus, the junior attorney
is decently confident that the restaurant’s smoothie recipes are protected
trade secrets under Iowa law. Simple enough.
What our junior attorney has done is a legal analysis. She has
determined how a body of law applies to a set of facts. The conclusion of a
PFLAUM, LEGAL WRITING BY DESIGN: A GUIDE TO GREAT BRIEFS AND MEMOS 158 (2d ed. 2013) (“Legal memos are result
oriented; through them, we predict a likely outcome to a legal problem and advise our client accordingly.”); DERNBACH ET
AL., supra note 5, at 268 (“Legal memos are written to predict outcomes, and your prediction is reflected in your
conclusion.”); TERRILL POLLMAN, JUDITH M. STINSON, RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & ELIZABETH POLLMAN, LEGAL
WRITING: ExAMPLES & ExPLANATIONS 19 (2011) (“Typically, an office memo is predictive—it answers a question about how
the law would likely apply to a particular set of facts and predicts the outcome.”); EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 155 (“Making an
accurate prediction, then, is the function of an office memo.”); MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY HALLAM DESANCTIS,
LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 185 (2009) (labeling office memoranda “objective (or predictive) legal documents”);
DEBORAH A. SCHMEDEMANN & CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, SYNTHESIS: LEGAL READING, REASONING, AND WRITING 134 (3d ed.
2007) (noting that “predicting how the legal system would respond to the client’s situation” is one function of a legal memo-
randum); CATHY GLASER, JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, ROBERT A. RUESCHER & LYNN BOEPPLE SU, THE LAWYER’S CRAFT: AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL ANALYSIS, WRITING, RESEARCH, AND ADVOCACY 111 (2002) (“If the memo writer does not
make a prediction and support it with carefully presented legal analysis, the writer might just as well have not written the
memo.”).
7 See, e.g., RAMBO & PFLAUM, supra note 6, at 546 (“The court will likely conclude that Lionell sufficiently alleged that
Walker’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.”).
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legal analysis should be a statement about the law, not a prediction about
the decisionmaker. For example, based on her legal analysis, our junior
attorney could accurately write the following legal conclusion:
Iowa law likely protects the restaurant’s smoothie recipes as trade
secrets. 
This legal conclusion is focused on the present; it states how the law
applies to a particular set of facts. The law itself is the actor; it either
protects the recipes as trade secrets or it does not. But based only on her
legal analysis, it would be inaccurate for our junior attorney to write the
following predictive conclusion:
The court is likely to find that the restaurant’s smoothie recipes
are protected as trade secrets under Iowa law. 
Our junior attorney hasn’t assessed any extralegal factors that may
sway the outcome. She hasn’t analyzed the potential prejudices of the deci-
sionmaker or the reputations of the parties. She simply is in no position to
offer a prediction about what “the court” is likely to do or not do.8 Sure,
she has one big chunk of the puzzle—the proper legal analysis—but
proper legal analysis does not always dictate outcomes.9 In short, “the
master of law” and “the master of prediction” would not always reach the
same outcome.10
Extralegal analysis involves consideration of anything, other than the
law, that could affect the outcome.11 Anyone who thinks that cases are
decided by the law alone is “fooling themselves.”12 Judges are “not moral or
8 Professor Mark Osbeck recently chronicled, in impressive detail, the shortcomings of traditional element-based analysis as
a predictive tool. Osbeck, supra note 1, at 65–77.
9 In his article, Osbeck identified that lawyers have principally relied on three tools to create their predictions, and legal
analysis is only one of those tools. Osbeck, supra note 1, at 45, 53–64. Lawyerly experience and empirical information are the
other two. Id.
10 Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773, 783 (1998). Schauer gave the following example of
how a predictor might blend together consideration of relevant factors, some legal and some not:
Suppose we were to ask someone to predict a future judicial decision under the “best interests of the child”
standard. My suspicion is that the predictor would first ask about the features of the dispute whose resolution
she is being asked to predict. She would want to know the characteristics of the parents, the characteristics of the
child, and related matters. But when it came down to prediction, she would predict on the basis of these charac-
teristics by knowing which of these characteristics were likely important in this court, based on an analysis of
past decisions by this court. 
Id. at 787.
11Osbeck observed that, when predicting an outcome:
[A]n experienced lawyer may take into account the background and perceived predilections of the individual
judge(s) involved in the case particularly if the lawyer has personal experiences to draw on with respect to these
variables. The experienced lawyer may also factor in non-doctrinal considerations such as the equities of the
lawsuit, the sympathetic or not-so-sympathetic nature of the parties, the reputation of the opposing counsel, etc. 
Osbeck, supra note 1, at 59–60 (internal citations omitted).
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intellectual giants (alas), prophets, oracles, mouthpieces, or calculating
machines. They are all-too-human workers, responding as other workers
do to the conditions of the labor market in which they work.”13 Simply put,
they “are not machines, and they cannot be counted on to apply legal rules
to the facts in a purely mechanical manner.”14 Judges bring their priors,
“the expectations, formed by background, experience, and temperament,
that every decision maker brings to a dispute that he is asked to resolve.”15
And they often also face significant docket pressure, especially at the trial
level, and need to weigh the costs of taking the time to arrive at the “right”
outcome against the sheer need to efficiently dispose of cases.16 As such,
they are prone to mistakes, abuses, and neglects.17
There are hosts of extralegal issues that—rightfully or not—may
influence decisionmaking: prejudice based on certain characteristics of the
parties or the parties’ attorneys, the financial resources of the parties, the
publicity surrounding a case, public opinion, social trends, and on and
on.18 Indeed, matters so seemingly trivial as the length of time since the
judge’s latest food break may influence the decision.19
A junior attorney or a law student certainly could attempt to write a
memorandum that contains full consideration of both the legal analysis
and the extralegal analysis and venture a prediction of the likely outcome
of a future motion or legal proceeding. Tools exist—and costly legal
consultants exist—to aid in discerning a decisionmaker’s tendencies.20
Judicial analytics may help discover whether a particular judge is likely to
12 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 130 (2013) [hereinafter POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING]; see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 72 (2008) [hereinafter POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK]; E.W. THOMAS, THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, PRACTICAL REASONING AND PRINCIPLES 24 (2005) (“As a description of the
incremental, intuitive decision-making of judges in general, the title to this chapter [‘Muddling along’] is not unduly harsh.”).
13 POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 12, at 7.
14Osbeck, supra note 1, at 71–72.
15 POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, supra note 12, at 129–30.
16 See Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 406, 407 n.6 (1972) (opining that the
“greatest district judges [are not] those who stew for months and then write a long opinion on a novel point of law concerning
which they are almost certain not to have the last word”); see also POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 12, at 141
(“Because judges are sensitive to both backlogs and reversal, they will not, by making precipitate rulings, allow their backlogs
to grow to inordinate length merely to reduce the probability of reversal, or their reversal rates to soar merely to eliminate
their backlogs.”).
17 It likely goes without saying that juries similarly bring their priors and biases to decisionmaking. See, e.g., POSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING, supra note 12, at 304–06.
18 See, e.g., id. at 115; POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, supra note 12, at 69–70.
19 See Shai Danziger, Jonathan Levav & Liora Avnaim-Pesso, Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PNAS 6889
(2011). But see Keren Weinshall-Margel & John Shapard, Overlooked Factors in the Analysis of Parole Decisions, 108 PNAS
E833 (2011) (criticizing the previously cited study).
20Widely available commercial services like Bloomberg Law and Westlaw can generate fairly detailed analytics about parties,
lawyers, law firms, judges, and courts. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG LAW, https://www.bna.com/litigation-analytics/ (last visited
Sept. 24, 2018).
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dispose of a trade secrets lawsuit at the summary judgment stage, or
whether a court tends to rule in favor of corporate defendants or indi-
vidual plaintiffs. However, the analytical documents that are assigned to
junior attorneys and law students rarely ask them to take account of
extralegal factors.21 Overwhelmingly, these documents only call for—and
only contain—legal analysis.22 As such, professors and legal supervisors
should instruct their charges to arrive at a legal conclusion, not a
predictive one.23
Simply put, there is a meaningful difference between legal analysis
and prediction. In a world where extralegal analysis and litigation
consultants are increasingly part of litigation practice and detailed
analytics are available at the click of a button,24 it is at best mildly
misleading and at worst downright inaccurate for a legal writer to
conclude what “the court” is likely to find unless the writer has incor-
porated extralegal factors into the analysis.25 Moreover, there may be times
when a law student or a junior attorney is called upon to incorporate
analytics and actually make a prediction about what a particular deci-
sionmaker will do. If we’ve already taught them that legal analysis is
inherently predictive, we won’t have any vocabulary left to describe the act
of combining legal analysis with extralegal analysis to forecast how a judge
or court will decide an issue in the future.
Additionally, it is exceedingly strange to phrase a conclusion about
something that has already occurred as a future prediction. Returning to
the trade secrets example, either the law protects the recipes as trade
secrets or it does not. If it does, then that protection arose sometime in the
21 For example, one legal writing text includes a very thoughtful list of “How to Test Your Writing for Predictiveness”
without ever mentioning the relevance of extralegal factors or characteristics of the decisionmaker. See NEUMANN &
TISCIONE, supra note 3, at 72–74. Analysis of extralegal considerations simply isn’t part of introductory instruction in legal
writing.
22 To clarify, writers of legal analyses should do their best to set aside their own prejudices, priors, and other extralegal
influences. Just like judges, they should endeavor to apply the law in a neutral (some would say “objective”) way divorced from
their personal preferences. But just like judges, writers of legal analyses are all too human and will inevitably fail to achieve
complete neutrality. Nonetheless, the goal of a legal analysis should be to get as close as possible to a neutral application of
the law to the facts.
23To be clear, I am not recommending that the law school legal writing curriculum should be overhauled to incorporate extralegal
analysis into assignments geared at first-year law students. Legal analysis is generally enough for them to wrestle with.
24 See Osbeck, supra note 1, at 61 (“[E]mpirical information is likely to become increasingly important in this age of data
analytics . . . .”). Osbeck explains how data science is currently used in the practice of law and the increasing role it may play
in prediction in the future. Id. at 85–101.
25 Perhaps some supervisory attorneys understand that predictive language is not meant literally, and they interpret the
phrase “the court will likely find x” to instead mean “the court should likely find x,” or, “if the court properly applies the
existing law, it will likely find x.” See, e.g., id. at 59 (“Seasoned lawyers instinctively temper the predictive analysis of an
associate’s legal memorandum with their own experience in assessing the likely outcome of cases.”). I can’t say whether and
to what extent this occurs. Regardless, I see no reason to perpetuate this type of inaccuracy when reporting the results of a
legal analysis—and this is especially true in today’s legal culture where extralegal analyses are becoming increasingly
common.
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past—likely at the moment that the recipes were created. The law’s
protection is something that has already occurred, not something that
occurs only once a future judge reveals it to be so.
To take another example, consider an analysis of whether a neighbor
committed a trespass or not. The trespass either occurred or it didn’t
occur in the past—at the moment of the disputed incident between the
two neighbors. The analysis is backward looking; its focus should be on
how the law applies to the past event. Thus, it is downright odd to couch
the statement of conclusion in terms of a prediction about a future event,
but that is exactly what happens when the conclusion is written as a
prediction about what the court is likely to find or not find. Whether a
trespass occurred does not depend on a later court declaring it as such.
Either the incident that occurred was a trespass or it wasn’t a trespass in a
legal sense, even if no court ever rules on the issue. To avoid the oddity of
writing about a past event as a future prediction, our junior attorney
should write a statement of conclusion that focuses on the legal determi-
nation as a past event rather than on some future decisionmaker’s analysis
of the past event.
Thus, law professors and attorney supervisors shouldn’t be instructing
new legal writers to couch the conclusions of their legal analyses in
predictive terms when they haven’t truly done a predictive analysis.26
Predictive language should be reserved for actual predictions.
II. Predictive Conclusions are (Rightfully) Daunting to
New Legal Writers
Although they may not be able to put their finger on it with speci-
ficity, new legal writers sense that predictive conclusions are inaccurate,
and it makes some of them quite uncomfortable.27 Numerous new law
students over the years have expressed to me that they are intimidated by
the prospect of making legal predictions.28 When assigned to answer a
legal question, they avoid the task: their “analysis” consists of a list of
26 Predictions about what the parties are likely to do should likewise be avoided, unless the writer has truly considered how
characteristics of the party are likely to influence their actions. See, e.g., GLASER ET AL., supra note 6, at 401 (“The prose-
cution is likely to prove that Dunn used or exhibited a deadly weapon . . . .”). A writer should not be assessing what a
prosecutor is likely to prove without considering all sorts of considerations about the prosecutor’s competence and habits.
27 See, e.g., Andrew J. Turner, Helping Students Grow Professionally and Overcome Fear: The Benefits of Teaching Unqualified
Brief Answers, 25 PERSP. 3, 4 (2016) (“My students often object to unqualified brief answers for a simple reason: Who really
knows what a judge or jury will decide? Unqualified brief answers, they protest, overstate a lawyer’s ability to predict
outcomes.”).
28 See GLASER ET AL., supra note 6, at 111 (“Predicting the outcome of a legal question is one of the most difficult challenges
facing the novice legal memo writer.”)
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reasons why the outcome may be “yes” and a list of reasons why the
outcome may be “no,” and then concludes with a statement that “ulti-
mately it will be up to the court to decide.” Then we have an exchange like
the following:
“You failed to state a conclusion,” I say, “No one is going to pay you a lot
of money to tell them that ‘it is up to the court to decide.’”
They respond, “How should I know what the court will do? I only started
law school a month ago. What if I’m wrong and the court doesn’t do
what I say it is going to do?”
“Fair enough,” I say, “but don’t think of your job as predicting what the
court will do. Courts do bizarre things sometimes. Courts also make
mistakes. I’m not asking you to try to guess what a hypothetical judge
would do. I want you to take on the role of judge and tell me how you
would decide the case if you properly applied the law to the facts in front
of you. In that situation, what would the conclusion be?”29
Freed from the shackles of predicting what some hypothetical “court”
is likely to do, these students are now up to the task. Conceptualizing the
question as “how would you apply the law to the facts” puts new legal
writers much more at ease. They now inhabit the role of the deci-
sionmaker. And, as decisionmaker, they recognize the importance of
actually reaching a decision rather than abdicating the final analysis to
some other later “court” to figure out. They are the decisionmaker, so they
must decide: do the facts satisfy the legal test, or do they not?30
Inhabiting the role of the decisionmaker also breeds confidence. A
prediction is provable as right or wrong. A junior attorney who writes that
“the court is likely to find that the smoothie recipes are protected as trade
secrets” will appear to be “right” or “wrong” depending on the court’s
decision. The prospect of being branded as “wrong” can be a significant
hurdle for some people, especially in the anxiety-inducing world of high-
stakes litigation. Legal writers should not be pushed into making a
prediction unless they truly have the tools to conduct the extralegal
analyses necessary to support a prediction.
29 See also DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 5, at 268 (encouraging students to “think like a judge” when writing legal
memoranda: “Put yourself in the position of the judge who will resolve this case after weighing all competing arguments.
What law and what facts would you, as the judge, rely on? What would you decide as a judge?”).
30 Casting the student in the role of the judge does not necessarily mean that the conclusion must be stated with unqualified
certainty. However, qualifying a conclusion with words such as “likely” and “probably” should not be the product of a
student’s lack of confidence in her budding analytical abilities or of her inability to know what some third-party deci-
sionmaker is going to do. Rather, it should reflect the unsettled nature of the law in certain areas. See Turner, supra note 27,
at 6.
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Instead, new legal writers should be taught to respect the limits of
their analyses. If they have done a legal analysis, then a legal conclusion is
appropriate. For example, a junior attorney who concludes that “the
smoothie recipes are likely protected as trade secrets” isn’t necessarily
“wrong” if the court ultimately rules the other way. Maybe it is the court
that was wrong. The junior and senior attorney can then bond over their
shared dissatisfaction with the court’s analysis. That is a much better
outcome than the junior attorney fearing that she will be blamed for her
wrong prediction. After all, if every court got every decision right,
appellate opinions would be dreadfully boring to read.31 Matching the
appropriate conclusion to the appropriate type of analysis creates comfort
and can ultimately lead to a better work product.
III. Conclusion
Predicting what a court is likely to do is a tall task and involves innu-
merable calculations, not the least of which is sussing out the
decisionmaker’s prejudices and tendencies and sorting through any
attendant social pressures to rule in a particular way. Rightfully, this type
of extralegal analysis is not a task that novice legal writers are generally
called upon to do. Instead, law students and most of the junior attorneys
they emulate conduct solely legal analyses. They apply bodies of law to
sets of facts to arrive at legal conclusions. As such, we should not instruct
them that they are authoring “predictive documents” that end with
conclusions espousing what “the court” is likely to do. Their conclusions
should reflect the limits of their analyses, and they simply aren’t in the
position to confidently posit predictions about a hypothetical deci-
sionmaker’s future behavior. Thus, we should take the focus off the
decisionmaker and put it on the decision. Novice legal writers are not
predicting anything; they are only analyzing.
Moreover, forcing new legal writers into making predictions about
decisionmakers can be intimidating, especially when the writer senses that
the prediction is misleading. Instead, law students and junior attorneys
should be instructed to don the decisionmaker’s cap for themselves and
31 Not only that, but we wouldn’t need attorneys in the first place. In the law school setting, students should learn early and
often that courts do not always engage in perfect legal analysis and not every precedent can be reconciled with every other
precedent. See supra section 1. As recounted in one federal judge’s own story of coming to terms with this hard truth, it is
simply not accurate or useful for law students or recent graduates to regard judges as robotic engines of legal application. See
Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274,
274–79 (1924) (chronicling Judge Hutcheson’s journey from a law graduate who believed that judges “coldly and logically
determined the relation of the facts of a particular case to [the] established precedents” to a seasoned practitioner and later
judge who came to the realization that “hunches” and intuition play a major role in process of judicial decisionmaking).
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determine the appropriate legal conclusion. Law professors and attorney
supervisors need to recognize—and convey—that their junior colleagues
function as informers, not predictors. We ask them to discover how the
law, as it currently exists, correctly applies to a set of facts. We ask them to
apprise us of this information so that we may use it to advise the client.
We should not ask them to foresee the outcome of a third-party’s
future decision based solely on legal analysis. Legal analysis is a necessary-
but-insufficient input in predicting a decisionmaker’s behavior. Thus, we
should expect statements of the writer’s conclusions to reflect this
distinction and to accurately convey the limits of their analyses. While that
distinction may feel relatively minor, it can make all the difference when
shepherding novice legal writers toward reaching a conclusion and stating
it plainly.
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